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Abstract 
The collapse of prominent companies coupled with the increasing number of lawsuits against the directors of the 
companies for wrongdoing has raised concerns with insider trading activities. Insider trading does cause significant 
market reaction, whereby the insiders are able to earn significant cumulative abnormal returns for both purchases 
and sales. However, studies on the factors influencing insider trading are relatively scarce. This study aims to 
examine the factors that influence insider trading activities. Specifically, this study examines the relationship 
between four corporate governance factors, namely, board independence, board size, executive compensation and 
ownership concentration and insider trading activities in public listed companies in Malaysia. This study evinces that 
board size and executive compensation significantly influence insider purchases. On the other hand, significant 
market reaction caused by insider sales may be explained by other factors. Therefore, future studies could be carried 
out on other factors that may influence opportunistic insider sales. This study also found evidence against the semi-
strong form Efficient Market Hypothesis theory that suggests insiders cannot earn abnormal returns in a semi-strong 
efficient market using public information. 
Keywords: Insider trading; Cumulative abnormal returns; Market reaction; Corporate governance.  
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1. Introduction 
Insider trading issues have been extensively discussed in the literature, especially on how insider trading affects 
market efficiency and subsequently, investors. Insider trading can also be considered as a test of share market 
efficiency (Theissen and Betzer, 2009) Insider trading does not uphold the principle of fairness. Violation of the 
principle of fairness can reduce the investors’ confidence since the insiders use the undisclosed information to gain 
abnormal returns, whereas the investors do not have access to it Kadir and Muhamad (2012a) Studies have found 
that insider trading has a negative effect on market efficiency, thus causing noise in the share prices due to 
information asymmetry (Ameer and Othman, 2008). Noise in share price is defined as information that causes severe 
deviation from the expected price (Feng, 2014). The noise will adversely influence market liquidity and participation 
as well as the behaviour of incompetent companies (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). As a result, the economic growth 
of the country may be adversely affected due to the declining number of potential investors. 
Insider trading can also cause interference in the share market as it affects market reaction (Agrawal and 
Cooper, 2015; Finnerty, 1976; He and Rui, 2016; Yusof  et al., 2013). These studies have shown that using 
undisclosed information held by the insiders provides abnormal returns, notwithstanding the trading is of insider 
trading purchases or insider trading sales (Alireza and Ahmad, 2003); (Chauhan  et al., 2016). This circumstance 
violates the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis that believes individuals cannot earn abnormal returns because 
the share prices are reflected in the disclosed information. It also violates strong form market efficiency, where the 
share prices do not reflect public and private information, subsequently allowing insiders to earn abnormal returns. 
Many countries have established insider trading regulations due to the negative effect of insider trading 
activities on the share market, such as the U.S. and Taiwan. Insider trading activities are deemed to be immoral, 
unfair, injurious and a breach of investors’ fiduciary rights (He and Rui, 2016). In Malaysia, insider trading has 
received much attention over the last decade due to its negative effect on market efficiency. The Securities 
Commission of Malaysia is responsible for monitoring insider trading activities in the public listed companies. Over 
the years, the Securities Commission has strengthened and enhanced its enforcement unit (Ameer and Othman, 
2008), and since then, the Securities Commission has been handling an increasing number of insider trading cases 
each year.  
Despite the establishment of adequate regulations and more stringent enforcement against insider trading in 
Malaysia, the success of the authorities in curbing insider trading is still questionable which is reflected in the low 
prosecution rate in the country (Kadir and Muhamad, 2012a). Illegal insider trading activities are hard to detect 
because of the difficulty in differentiating between abnormal volume traded by the insiders and the increase in share 
prices due to speculation. Furthermore, the ambiguity of the regulations has also contributed to the difficulty in 
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detecting illegal insider trading activitiesy (Adams  et al., 2016). Other than that, investors who do not realize that 
they are the victims of insider trading, also contribute to the low prosecution rate (Kadir and Muhamad, 2012a). 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance structure and insider trading 
activities through market reaction. These studies have found that good corporate governance enhances monitoring 
and deters insiders from trading on undisclosed information by reducing access to undisclosed information (Chauhan  
et al., 2016; Dayanandan  et al., 2014; He and Rui, 2016; Kiwia, 2017) . However, very few studies have examined 
this issue (Rozanov, 2008). Furthermore, no study has yet to examine the relationship between insider trading 
activities and corporate governance in the context of Malaysia.  
This study aims to examine the relationship between four corporate governance mechanisms, namely, board 
independence, executive compensation, board size and ownership concentration and insider trading activities in 
public listed companies in Malaysia. The findings of this study can provide a better understanding on whether or not 
different environments and market conditions influence insider trading activities, especially since such a study has 
never been done in Malaysia.  
This study examines market reaction of 256 companies, whose directors and officers were involved in insider 
trading in 2016, as well as its relationship with corporate governance. This study finds that insider trading in 
Malaysia does cause significant market reaction. The results also show the percentage of abnormal returns gained 
from insider sales is higher than insider purchases. Further analysis also finds that executive compensation and board 
size influence insider purchases. The results indicate Malaysia’s public listed companies have an appropriate board 
size and provide sufficient compensation to deter insiders from engaging in insider trading activities. However, the 
analysis finds no significant relationship between board independence, executive compensation, board size and 
ownership concentration and insider sales. The results indicate significant market reaction due to insider sales may 
be explained by other factors. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on insider trading as studies on insider trading are scarce, 
especially in Malaysia. It provides an avenue for more debate on the association between corporate governance and 
insider trading activities since findings from previous studies have often been mixed. In addition, no study is 
available on the relationship between corporate governance and insider trading in Malaysia. Therefore, this study is 
the first of its kind in the Malaysian market context. Furthermore, the findings of this study may provide insights to 
the relevant authorities to enhance their monitoring and enforcement. Market reaction or cumulative abnormal 
returns may be a red flag for insider trading activities and a starting point for an investigation to be initiated. Lastly, 
the paper also enriches understanding on the level of efficiency of the Malaysian market. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is on the literature review on insider trading, 
Section 3 develops four hypotheses and Section 4 describes the research methodology. Section 5 reports the 
empirical findings and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Insider Trading 
Insider trading activities in the capital market have been in existence since the commencement of business 
operations (Sarli  et al., 2013). The increase of lawsuits against directors and officers on their trading activities prior 
to the revelation of accounting scandals has raised concerns with insider trading activities. Studies have found that 
insider trading has a negative effect on market efficiency that is caused by the information asymmetry between the 
insiders and the outside investors. Information asymmetry occurs when there is a gap between what the insiders 
know and what the outsiders know. The bigger the information gap between the insiders and the outsiders, the bigger 
the gains that the insiders accrue (Kiwia, 2017).  
Insider trading motivates managers to withhold information by altering the company’s direction in order to 
increase trading profit and value (Zekos, 1998). Insiders usually engage in insider trading because they are driven by 
insider opportunism to gain abnormal returns at the expense of the outsiders (Hamouda and Ben Arab, 2013; Sarli  et 
al., 2013).  
To date, there is still doubt as to why insiders carry out insider trading. It may be related to the information gap 
or other factors, such as tax avoidance or portfolio diversification (Kiwia, 2017). Insider trading is one of the red 
flags in accounting fraud since it exploits material information that may adversely affect the share prices and 
subsequently harm the outsiders (Rozanov, 2008). Insiders have an unfair advantage over investors, thus making 
their trading of shares illegal on the grounds of justice (Strudler, 2011), and creating an uncompetitive capital market 
(Kadir and Muhamad, 2012a).  
As mentioned above, in Malaysia, the Securities Commission of Malaysia is the regulatory body that is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing insider trading regulations. It continuously reinforces proper market 
conduct so that the companies would act in the best interests of their investors. This is done by continuous 
monitoring of the companies for early detection of insider trading. The Securities Commission is also in the process 
of developing a corporate analytical platform to regulate the capital market (Securities Comission, 2016). However, 
the database on insider trading cases that are still under investigation or being charged is unavailable. Nevertheless, 
general information about insider trading cases can be found in the Securities Commission website. The absence of 
an insider trading database makes it difficult to assess the actual number of cases that have been or are being 
investigated.  
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2.2. Abnormal Returns 
Finnerty (1976) discovered abnormal returns when he found insiders can beat the market in a semi-strong 
efficient market that is against the efficient market hypothesis. Many studies on insider trading have found that 
insiders can earn abnormal returns that come about from the price change due to the undisclosed information 
discovered through insider trading (Alireza and Ahmad, 2003; Chauhan  et al., 2016; Finnerty, 1976; He and Rui, 
2016; Yusof  et al., 2013).  There are two patterns of insider trading, namely, routine and opportunistic. Previous 
studies have found opportunistic insider trading provides more abnormal returns compared to routine insider trading 
(Rasel Chawdhury  et al., 2015). Studies have also provided evidence that insiders intentionally hold price-sensitive 
information in order to maximize abnormal returns. Many studies on insider trading have used abnormal returns to 
measure market reaction (Chauhan  et al., 2016; He and Rui, 2016; Yusof  et al., 2013). These authors have found 
significant market reaction where the insiders earned higher abnormal returns after the purchase date. The insiders 
have also avoided continuous abnormal loss by selling their shares (Alireza and Ahmad, 2003; Chauhan  et al., 2016; 
He and Rui, 2016; Yusof  et al., 2013). 
 
2.3. Regulations on Insider Trading 
Due to the unfair provision of information and information asymmetry, many countries have legalized insider 
trading regulations and the number of insider trading regulations is on the increase. As of 2004, at least 93 countries 
have formalized regulations on insider trading and the impact of such legislation has been positive (Kadir and 
Muhamad, 2012b). The restrictions on insider trading promote information accuracy, wider share distribution and 
liquidity improvement (Brochet, 2010; Kadir and Muhamad, 2012b) and alter insiders’ behaviour (Rozanov, 2008).  
Malaysia also has become more aware of the effect of insider trading activities on market efficiency and such 
awareness is reflected in the legislation of insider trading regulations (Kadir and Muhamad, 2012a). Insider trading 
regulations in Malaysia regulate market behaviour and protect investors (Wong  et al., 2010). Malaysia has the 
following regulations that prohibit insider trading: 
 132, 132A and 132B of 132, 132A and 132B of the Companies Act 1965; 
 Part H, Chapter 9 of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad; and 
 Division 2, Section 89-89P, Part IX of Securities of Securities Industry Act 1983. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
Several studies have examined the link between corporate governance and information asymmetry and its 
influence on insider trading activities (Chauhan  et al., 2016; He and Rui, 2016) (Huang  et al., 2012a); (Kiwia, 
2017); (Rozanov, 2008). These studies have found that corporate governance can influence insider trading activities, 
resulting significant market reaction after the insiders have purchased or s(old their shares. A good corporate 
governance mechanism contributes to an increase in and accuracy of information disclosure and prevents the insiders 
from exploiting undisclosed information (Dai  et al., 2013) (Dai  et al., 2013); (He and Rui, 2016). It also helps in 
mitigating information asymmetry, improves financial transparency and subsequently, protects the investors (He and 
Rui, 2016). 
 
3.1. Board Independence 
Board independence is an indicator of effective corporate governance that can minimize price adjustment due to 
private information misappropriation by insiders (Chauhan  et al., 2016). This is supported by Coles  et al. (2008) 
and (Linck  et al., 2008), who found an increase in the ratio of independent directors leads to more efficient 
corporate governance. High board independence provides absolute advantage, especially to large shareholders since 
the management becomes more efficient (Wu and Li, 2016). This is consistent with (Chen  et al., 2006) who found a 
greater number of independent directors on the board can prevent fraud in the company. Independent directors assist 
in reducing information asymmetry and improving quality and transparency of information disclosure, hence 
resulting in less market reaction. Furthermore, independent directors can act in the best interests of the shareholders 
in order to maintain their reputation (Kiwia, 2017). However,(Jensen, 1993) believed that a high ratio of independent 
directors reduces board effectiveness due to information asymmetry between them and the management team. 
Romano (2005) and Chauhan  et al. (2016) found that independent directors do not act independently as they should 
because they have become part of the management team or they have an indirect relationship with the top 
management. Therefore, they would be more likely to misappropriate undisclosed information in order to earn 
abnormal returns at the expense of the shareholders.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H1a & H1b: There is a significant relationship between board independence and insider purchases (sales) 
activity 
 
3.2. Board Size 
The board of directors is the front-liner in ensuring that the company has an efficient and effective monitoring 
system (Rozanov, 2008). However, researchers have frequently debated on the optimal number of board directors in 
a company. Huang  et al. (2012b), Cormier  et al. (2010) and Naimi Mohamad-Nor  et al. (2010)  believed that a 
small board leads to efficient corporate governance and effective monitoring because it contributes to better 
decision-making through effective consensus and communication. On the other hand, (Dayanandan  et al., 2014; 
Ghazali, 2010) and found that a large board enhances monitoring as the responsibilities can be distributed among the 
board members. Furthermore, increase in board size enhances the control mechanism in the company and reduces 
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the likelihood of insider trading activities (Dayanandan  et al., 2014).  However, Kiwia (2017) found a positive 
relationship between board size and insider trading as it results in bigger market reaction. On the other hand, 
Rozanov (2008) and Wu and Li (2016) found that a company that has too large or too small a board relative to 
company size and industry size is likely to trade based on private information. Therefore, the following research 
hypotheses are developed: 
H2a & H2b: There is a significant relationship between board size and insider purchases (sales) activity. 
 
3.3. Executive Compensation 
Compensation can be paid in cash or through share options. Compensation can be a good deterrence for insiders 
to engage in fraud activities, such as insider trading. According to Burns and Kedia (2006), compensation can be one 
of the important factors for top management not to commit fraud, as an adequate compensation can induce the top 
management to provide full commitment in carrying out their duties Burns and Kedia (2006). The Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) of companies can also reduce insider trading activities as they often receive high compensation 
(Roulstone, 2003) and hence, feel committed to enhance company performance (Jackson  et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, the trend of providing equity compensation that aligns the interests between management and the shareholders 
is increasing (Dayanandan  et al., 2014). Some companies offer equity compensation in order to save costs by giving 
a low salary base to the management (McGee, 2007) Arguably, it allows the management to trade using undisclosed 
information to match their pay with responsibility. However, Denis  et al. (2013) found that when a company  uses 
equity compensation to establish insider trading restriction, it reduces insider trading activities. Therefore, the 
following research hypotheses are developed:  
H3a & H3b: There is a significant relationship between executive compensation and insider purchases (sales) 
activity 
 
3.4. Ownership Concentration 
High ownership concentration contributes to information asymmetry because the insiders’ involvement in the 
business operations decreases the accuracy of information. At the same time, the insiders may be reluctant to 
disclose company-specific information (Chauhan  et al., 2016). Ma  et al. (2010) believed high ownership 
concentration allows insiders to manipulate the management for personal advantage at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. This is consistent with (Fan and Wong, 2002) who found highly concentrated ownership encourages 
the management to engage in earnings management in order to inflate their company’s value and make profit 
through insider trading. In addition, (He and Rui, 2016) found that highly concentrated ownership is more likely to 
purchase own shares in order to maximize their profit. Conversely, (Gillan and Starks, 2003) suggested that high 
ownership concentration reduces insider trading activities because it increases management turnover resulting in 
better monitoring function. Therefore, the following research hypotheses are developed:  
H4a & H4b: There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and insider purchase (sales) 
activity. 
 
4. Methodology/Materials 
This study selected companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia that were involved in insider trading 
in 2016 and made announcement on Section 135 (S135) of the Companies Act 1965 as the sample. For year 2016, 
there were 7,115 announcements on S135, consisting of 5,215 share purchases and 2,409 share sales transactions 
done by directors and officers, involving 370 companies. However, only companies with more than 100,000 share 
transactions and open market transactions were chosen (Yusof  et al., 2013). Other types of transactions, option 
exercises and off-market transactions were excluded from the sample. Delisted companies and companies that 
entered into mergers after the trading date were also excluded due to inability to obtain their share price history.  
The data collection was conducted from two main sources, namely, the Bursa Malaysia website and 
DataStream. Information on the insider trading date, type and volume for 2016 was collected from the Company’s 
Announcement in Bursa’s official website. Information on traders’ name, trading date, type and details of transaction 
as well as number of shares traded was extracted from the announcement of S135 of the Companies Act 1965. 
Information on corporate governance, namely, proportion of independent directors, board size, executive 
compensation, substantial shareholders, total assets and number of board meetings held were extracted from the 
previous fiscal year of 2015 annual reports. For the company’s share price history, the data was extracted from 
DataStream. 
This study adopted a conventional event study methodology to determine market reaction. He and Rui (2016) 
suggested that insider trading activities influence market reaction. Market reaction was measured using the 
cumulative abnormal returns in estimating the impact of insider trading on the share market (Agrawal and Cooper, 
2015; He and Rui, 2016; Wu and Li, 2016; Yusof  et al., 2013). As for the event date, it is defined as the transaction 
day of insider trading (He and Rui, 2016; Wu and Li, 2016; Yusof  et al., 2013). For abnormal returns calculation, 
standard market model has been recommended by prior studies (Finnerty, 1976; Yusof  et al., 2013). The abnormal 
returns for each day was calculated using the company’s and market share returns. Market model estimator was 
calculated based on a period of the 41-day estimation window, centered on the event date. For the purpose of this 
study, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for four different event windows was calculated. It was done to assess 
the market reaction for pre-, during and post-insider trading activities as well as the entire 41-days event period, i.e., 
CAR (-20, 20), CAR (-20,-1), CAR (0,1) and CAR (0,20). In order to determine the relationship between insider 
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trading activities and corporate governance, CAR (0, 20) was used as the dependent variable as it captures complete 
market reaction after each insider trading activity  (He and Rui, 2016). We then regressed CARs for insider 
purchases and sales separately with the four corporate governance mechanisms.  
CARt     =    β0 + β¬1INDIRi t-1 + β¬2BSIZEi-1 + β3EXCOMi-1 + β¬4SSHAREi -1 + β5LgASSET i-1   +β-
6BMEET i-1   εi t-1 
Where CARt  is the cumulative abnormal returns for CAR (0,20), INDIR is the ratio of independent directors, 
BSIZE is the number of board directors, EXCOM is the average compensation of directors and SSHARE is the 
percentage of substantial shareholders. Our regression also includes control variables, i.e., LgAsset, which is the 
logarithm of total assets and BMEET, which is the number of board meetings held in 2015. 
 
5. Results and Findings 
5.1. Descriptive Statistic 
 
Table-1. Descriptive Statistics of Trading Activities by Directors and Officers 
 Purchases  (%) Sales (%) Total 
Transaction 949 61.8 586 38.2 1535 
Volume of shares traded (mil) 1.146 41.0 1.649 59.0 2.796 
No. of companies 146 57.0 126 49.2 256 
 
Table 1 reports the distribution of share transactions conducted by the directors or officers. The sample period 
covers 1,535 share transactions consisting of 949 or 61.8% share purchases and 568 or 38.2% share sales activities, 
involving 256 companies. A total of 2.795 million shares were traded consisting of 1.146 million or 41.0% share 
purchases and 1.649 million or 58.0% share sales. Table 1 shows that the volume for share sales is larger than share 
purchases, even though total transactions are smaller. This indicates that although share sales transactions are lesser 
than share purchases, the directors have traded in large volumes in every transaction. The finding in this study is 
consistent with (Chauhan  et al., 2016). 
 
Table-2. Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables 
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mini
mum 
Maxi
mum 
Purchases     
INDIR 0.458 .130 .004 .833 
BSIZE 7.340 1.582 4 11 
EXCOM 565.521 808.733 29.2 
5419.
571 
SSHARE 0.485 .171 .000 .850 
LgASSET 8.614 .724 4.128 
10.48
2 
BMEET 5.49 1.902 2 15 
No. of Companies (N) 146 
Sales     
INDIR 0.473 .127 .004 .800 
BSIZE 7.53 1.631 4 12 
EXCOM 677.091 1339.019 
45.66
7 
9875.
00 
SSHARE 0.474 .186 .093 .959 
LgASSET 8.694 .670 4.440 
10.55
0 
BMEET 5.41 1.966 0 13 
No. of Companies (N) 128 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for share purchases and sales by the insiders. On average, the proportion 
of independent directors and ownership concentration for companies that were involved in insider trading activities 
is approximately 50% and the average number of board members is seven. The result on proportion of independent 
directors shows that the companies have fulfilled Bursa Malaysia's Main Market Listing Requirement (2018) that the 
number of independent directors of a public listed company must be at least one third of the board of directors.  
For executive compensation, the result shows insiders who are involved in share sales earned higher 
compensation compared to the insiders who were involved in insider purchases. Based on the trading volume and 
average compensation on insider sales in Table 2, this study concludes that the executives earned higher equity 
compensation. This is evidenced by the results of average of cumulative abnormal returns in Figure 1 and Table 3, 
where they managed to avoid significant abnormal losses (Zekos, 1998).  
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5.2. Market Reaction 
 
Table-3. Market reaction due to insider trading analysis 
Event Window 
(CAR) 
Purchases Sales 
 Mean t-Value Mean t-Value 
(-20,20) 0.000% -.446 0.000% .314 
(-20,-1) -0.698% -1.429 0.916% 1.185 
(0,1) 0.962% .415 -0.270% -.731 
(0,20) 0.757% 1.833*** -1.058% 
-
2.159** 
N 146  128  
** significant at 5%-level (2-tailed) 
*** significant at 10%-level (2-tailed) 
  
In Table 3, CAR (-20, 20) shows that insiders earned insignificant zero abnormal returns for the whole 41-day 
event window for insider purchases and sales. Market reaction for CAR (-20,-1) and CAR (0,1) for both insider 
purchases and sales is also insignificant. However, the result shows a significantly positive market reaction with an 
average cumulative abnormal returns of 0.757% for 20 days after the insider purchase activities (CAR 0, 20). 
Similarly, insider sales show a significantly average abnormal returns with -2.023% for (CAR 0, 20). This finding 
indicates that the insiders managed to avoid negative abnormal returns by selling their shares based on the private 
information that they had while the outsiders suffered losses (Alireza and Ahmad, 2003; Chauhan  et al., 2016); (He 
and Rui, 2016; Yusof  et al., 2013). The results also show the percentage of average cumulative abnormal returns for 
insider sales is higher than the insider purchases. This suggests that the information content of insider sales is 
stronger than the insider purchases (Chauhan  et al., 2016).   
 
Figure-1.  Cumulative average abnormal returns for insider purchases and sales within the event window (-20,20) 
 
 
Figure 1 plots the cumulative average abnormal returns for insider purchases and sales. For insider purchases, 
the graph shows that the cumulative average abnormal returns increased starting day 17 before the event trading day 
and continuously increased for the following 13 days. The result is consistent with (Yusof  et al., 2013) who found 
cumulative average abnormal returns is due to the increase of insider trading activities over time in the Malaysian 
market. In addition, Figure 1 shows that the insiders continuously gained positive average abnormal returns after the 
event date. As for insider sales, the Figure 1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns started to decrease 
continuously on the event day and experienced abnormal loss starting day six after the trading date. This finding is 
consistent with (He and Rui, 2016) but inconsistent with (Yusof  et al., 2013) who found the cumulative abnormal 
returns due to insider trading decreased over time in the Malaysian share market. 
 
5.3. Regression Analysis 
For this study, CAR (0, 20) was used as the dependent variable as it captures a complete market reaction after 
insider trading activities. 
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Table-4. Regression Results of Market Reaction on Corporate Governance 
Independent 
Variables 
Purchase Sales 
Coefficient B T-Statistic Coefficient B T-Statistic 
Constant .004 .064 -.099 -1.348 
INDIR .025 .774 .053 1.259 
BSIZE .005 -1.681*** -.003 -1.014 
EXCOM -9.443E-7 -1.973** 5.405E-7 .142 
SSHARE -.026 1.027 .008 .299 
LgASSET -.003 .563 .009 1.271 
BMEET .002 -1.074 .000 .171 
R
2
 .073 .033 
Adjusted R
2
 .033 -.015 
F-Statistic 1.826 .692 
P-Value .097*** .657 
Company 148 128 
                                             ** significant at 5%-level (2-tailed) 
                                             *** significant at 10%-level (2-tailed) 
 
Based on Table 4, for insider purchases, the result shows there is a significant relationship between market 
reaction and the four corporate governance mechanisms, where executive compensation and board size are 
significant to insider trading activities. The results also show executive compensation has a negative effect on market 
reaction. In other words, the higher the compensation, the lesser the incentive for the directors or officers to engage 
in insider purchases (Huang  et al., 2012b; Jackson  et al., 2008; Wu and Li, 2016). The result indicates that 
executive compensation of the Malaysian public listed companies is relatively high and sufficient to prevent the 
directors and officers from engaging with insider trading. As for board size, it positively affected market reaction. 
This  is consistent with prior studies that have suggested that a small board contributes to good governance because 
it develops trust among board members and acts unanimously (Rozanov, 2008). Therefore, the results support H2a 
and H3a. 
As for insider sales, the results show that none of the independent variables has a significant relationship with 
market reaction. Although the market reaction for CAR (0, 20) for insider sales is significantly higher compared to 
insider purchases activity,  it cannot be explained by INDIR, BSIZE, EXCOM, SSHARE, LgASSET and BMEET. 
This finding suggests insiders may be driven by diversification or liquidity motives rather than by private 
information (He and Rui, 2016). The significant market reaction due to insider sales may be explained by other 
factors. The reasons as to why the directors or officers engaged less with insider sales but traded in a larger volume 
as compared to insider purchases may be rationalized.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In Malaysia, insider trading activities have caused significant market reaction, whereby the insiders have been 
able to earn significant cumulative abnormal returns for both purchases and sales. However, market reaction due to 
insider sales is stronger than insider purchases. It indicates that the insiders have managed to avoid losses by trading 
using private information. This study provides mixed findings on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and insider purchases and insider sales. For insider purchases, the results report a significant 
relationship between corporate governance components and insider trading activities for board size and executive 
compensation. For insider sales, this study shows a statistically insignificant relationship between all independent 
variables. This study cannot explain the significant market reaction due to insider sales. He and Rui (2016) suggested 
that the insiders may be driven by diversification or liquidity motives rather than by private information. Thus, the 
significant market reaction may be explained by other factors. In conclusion, insider trading does benefit the 
directors and officers, whether or not they purchase or sell their shares, which seems unfair to the outsiders. 
Therefore, the enforcement authorities may need to enhance their monitoring and enforcement activities in order to 
protect the outside shareholders.   
The interpretations of this study are subject to several limitations. First, due to the lack of detailed information 
on insider trading cases charged by the Securities Commission, this study focused on share trading conducted by 
directors and officers of companies announced in the Bursa website. Therefore, the insider trading activities in this 
study are not classified as illegal. The second limitation is share price data. The share price may change a few times 
during a trading day. Another limitation is the decision made by insiders to trade their shares may not be solely 
based on private information. This study did not analyse the rationalization behind the insiders’ decision. Due to lack 
of studies on insider trading activities in Malaysia, more research is recommended for this topic. In this study, 
insider sales have caused significant market reaction but this cannot be explained by the corporate governance 
mechanisms selected by this study. Future studies could be carried out on other factors that may influence 
opportunistic insider sales. Other than that, future research could be done on the information possessed by the 
insiders that influences them to sell their shares, in order to identify what the common private information is. 
Perhaps, future studies with a longer horizon for the same companies can be conducted so that the trend of market 
reaction can be analysed. 
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